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Abstract. The idea of combining a very simple form of added plaintext
redundancy with a special mode of data encryption to provide data in-
tegrity is an old one; however, despite its wide deployment in protocols
such as Kerberos, it has largely been superseded by provably secure au-
thenticated encryption techniques. In this paper we cryptanalyse a block
cipher mode of operation called IOBC, possibly the only remaining en-
cryption mode designed for such use that has not previously been ana-
lyzed. We show that IOBC is subject to known-plaintext-based forgery
attacks with a complexity of around 2n=3, where n is the block cipher
block length.
1 Introduction
This is perhaps the last chapter in a long and rather unfortunate story1, namely
that of `special' modes of operation for block ciphers, designed to oer `low cost'
combined integrity and condentiality protection by combining encryption with
the addition of simple (or xed) redundancy to the plaintext. The underlying
idea is to design the mode so that modifying the ciphertext without invalidating
the added redundancy is impossible without knowledge of the encryption key. It
is a long story since the idea dates back over 30 years, and a sad story because
one by one these special modes of operation have been shown to fail to meet
their objectives.
Such modes are the theme of section 9.6.5 of Menezes, van Oorschot and
Vanstone's landmark book [1]. As they point out, the starting point for the
development of such modes is the observation that encryption alone does not
guarantee integrity. This, combined with the observation that the `obvious' ap-
proach of encrypting the data and then separately computing a MAC involves
twice the work, leads to the alternative notion of adding detectable redundancy
before encrypting so that it can be detected after decryption. Two main methods
for adding redundancy have been proposed:
{ add a xed block at the end of the plaintext, which may be public or secret
(in the latter case the block acts as an auxiliary key);
1 Since ACISP has played its own part in this developing tale, it seems tting to
present this nal chapter at ACISP 2013.
{ append to the plaintext some easily computed and simple (public) function
of the plaintext.
In either case we refer to the block added to the end of the plaintext as a Ma-
nipulation Detection Code (MDC). Whichever approach is adopted, the method
for computing the MDC needs to be simple, or it oers no advantage over the
more conventional `encrypt then MAC' approach.
Note that there is a third, related, approach which remains viable and is, in-
deed, increasingly used; this involves computing a keyed function of the plaintext
(a sort of `weak MAC') which is then encrypted to make it secure. The plaintext
itself may or may not be encrypted. Indeed, one example of such an approach,
namely GCM/GMAC [2], has a proof of security and has been standardized [3,
4]. The main dierences between GCM (and other related techniques) and the
approaches we are concerned with here is that GCM uses a `standard' encryption
method and, of course, GCM has a proof of security.
At this point we observe that the general approaches described above possess
an intrinsic weakness if the method of adding redundancy is public2. Suppose an
attacker persuades the legitimate originator of protected messages to encrypt a
message containing a correct MDC somewhere in the middle (where the MDC
is correct in the sense that it is a correct MDC on the data that precedes it).
The attacker will then be able to delete all ciphertext blocks following the en-
crypted MDC, and such a change will not be detectable. Despite this weakness,
using an appropriate encryption mode combined with a public method for adding
veriable redundancy to a message has been widely used for message integrity
protection | e.g. in Kerberos (see, for example, [5]). We thus restrict our atten-
tion in the remainder of the paper to the case where the MDC is a secret value
(this is the approach proposed for use with the IOBC mode, which forms the
main subject of this paper).
Regardless of the nature of the MDC, the method of encryption needs to be
chosen with great care. Using a stream cipher or CBC mode encryption is clearly
totally insecure, since a ciphertext produced with such a technique can readily be
manipulated in such a way that large parts of the recovered plaintext, including
the end of the plaintext, remains unchanged. A simple modied version of CBC
called Plaintext Cipher Block Chaining (PCBC) [6, 7], in which the feedback
chaining variable is the exclusive-or of the immediately preceding ciphertext
and plaintext blocks, was proposed back in the 1980s to avoid this problem. This
scheme was used in Kerberos version 4 [7] to provide combined encryption and
integrity protection. The weakness of PCBC for use as an integrity-protection
mode was rst pointed out by Kohl [6]. As is simple to verify, Kohl showed that
interchanging two of the ciphertext blocks of a PCBC-encrypted message does
not aect the decryption of the nal block, i.e. it is extremely simple to make
undetectable changes to messages. Note that this is actually a stronger attack
than is implied by Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone [1] who refer only to
the danger of known-plaintext attacks.
2 This problem appears to be part of the cryptographic folklore | it was pointed out
to the author by Bart Preneel in the late 1990s
Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone [1] describe a slightly dierent mode,
confusingly also referred to as PCBC (this time for Plaintext-Ciphertext Block
Chaining), in which the feedback chaining variable is the modulo 2n sum of
the immediately preceding ciphertext and plaintext blocks. This technique was
also described as long ago as 1982 by Meyer and Matyas [8]. Unfortunately,
despite its long history, the latter version of PCBC was shown to possess major
weaknesses when used with an MDC for integrity protection in a 2005 ACISP
paper [9]. M-PCBC, a further variant of PCBC due to Sierra et al. [10], was
also shown to fail to oer appropriate MDC protection in the same ACISP 2005
paper [9]. Another variant of PCBC was proposed by Gligor and Donescu [11];
however, this latter scheme, known as iaPCBC, was shown to possess serious
vulnerabilities by Ferguson et al. [12]. Yet another scheme, called PES-PCBC,
was proposed by Zuquete and Guedes [13] but, as observed by Recacha [14]
as well the authors themselves [15], PES-PCBC is subject to known-plaintext
attacks.
Indeed, to the author's knowledge, almost all the proposals for such special
modes have been cryptanalyzed, with one exception | a scheme proposed in
1996 called Input and Output Block Chaining (IOBC) [14]. One possible reason
why IOBC has escaped attention is that until recently the only available de-
scription was in Spanish. However, recently an English language translation of
the original 1996 paper3 has been made available by the author, and it is this
translation that has been used as the basis of this paper. It is interesting to note
that IOBC has, nevertheless, had an impact on the cryptographic literature. A
modied version of IOBC, called EPBC, was published in 1997 [15] and was
subsequently cryptanalyzed in 2007 [16].
Finally we observe that, although the history of the area sketched above may
give the impression of an ordered and coherent narrative, the truth is somewhat
dierent. Ideas, and sometimes attacks, appear to have been put forward in-
dependently of one another, and one role of this introduction is to try to pull
together the main developments in the area.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides details
of the operation of IOBC and its use for integrity protection. This is followed in
section 3 by certain observations on the properties of IOBC and its component
functions. This sets the stage for section 4, in which a known plaintext forgery
attack against IOBC when used for integrity protection is described. A brief
discussion of possible xes to IOBC is given in section 5, before a certicational
chosen-plaintext attack on IOBC is outlined in section 6. Concluding remarks
are provided in section 7.
3 http://inputoutputblockchaining.blogspot.com.es/
2 The Recacha IOBC Mode
We next describe the operation of the IOBC block cipher mode of operation4. We
base our description on Recacha's 1996 paper [14], although we use the notation
of Mitchell [16].
2.1 Initial Assumptions
We suppose that IOBC is to be used with an n-bit block cipher, i.e. a block cipher
operating on plaintext and ciphertext blocks of n bits. We further suppose that
n is a power of two, and put n = 2m (as is the case for all standardized block
ciphers [17]). We write eK(P ) for the result of block cipher encrypting the n-
bit block P using the secret key K, and dK(C) for the result of block cipher
decrypting the n-bit block C using the key K. Finally we suppose the plaintext
to be protected is divided into a sequence of n-bit blocks (if necessary, having
rst been padded): P1; P2; : : : ; Pt.
2.2 Initialization Vectors
The scheme uses two secret n-bit Initialization Vectors (IVs), denoted by F0 and
G0. The nature of the intended restrictions on their use is not altogether clear.
However, one suggestion in the original Recacha paper [14] is that they should
be generated as follows.
Suppose K 0 is an auxiliary key used solely for generating the IVs. Suppose
also that S is a sequence number, managed so that dierent values are used for
every message. Then F0 = eK0(S) and G0 = eK0(F0). For the purposes of this
paper we assume that F0 and G0 are always generated this way, and thus the
scheme can be thought of as employing a pair of block cipher keys and a non-
secret, non-repeating, sequence number (which must be carefully managed to
prevent accidental re-use of sequence number values). Note that special measures
will need to be taken if the same key is to be used to encrypt communications
in both directions between a pair of parties. Avoiding sequence number re-use
in such a case could be achieved by requiring one party to start the sequence
number they use for encryption at a large value, perhaps halfway through the
range.
2.3 Operation
The IOBC encryption of the plaintext P1; P2; : : : ; Pt operates as follows:
Gi = Pi  Fi 1; (1  i  t);
Fi = eK(Gi); (1  i  t);
Ci = Fi  g(Gi 1); (2  i  t);
4 PES-PCBC (briey mentioned in section 1) is the same as IOBC with the exception
that in PES-PCBC the function g is the identity function.
where C1 = F1  G0,  denotes bit-wise exclusive-or, and g is a function that
maps an n-bit block to an n-bit block, dened below. The operation of the mode
(when used for encryption) is shown in Figure 1. Note that we refer to the values
Fi and Gi as `internal' values, as they are computed during encryption, but they
do not constitute part of the ciphertext.
Fig. 1. IOBC encryption
The function g is dened as follows. Suppose X is an n-bit block, where
n = 2m. Suppose also that X = LjjR where L is the leftmost 2m 1   1 bits of
X and R is the rightmost 2m 1 + 1 bits of X (and, as throughout, jj denotes
concatenation). Then
g(X) = (>1 (L))jj(>1 (R))
where >i denotes a rightwards (cyclic) shift by i bit positions.
Decryption operates similarly. We have:
Fi = Ci  g(Gi 1); (2  i  t);
Gi = dK(Fi); (1  i  t);
Pi = Gi  Fi 1; (1  i  t):
and F1 = C1 G0, where d denotes block cipher decryption.
2.4 Additional Remarks
As described above, we assume throughout that the IVs F0 and G0 are derived
by ECB-mode-encrypting a sequence number using a secondary key. Thus the
ciphertext blocks will be a function of this serial number (as well as the pair of
keys used). We thus write [S]; C1; C2; : : : ; Ct for a sequence of ciphertext blocks,
meaning that C1; C2; : : : ; Ct were encrypted using the sequence number S. This
is logical, since the sequence number will need to be sent or stored with the
ciphertext to enable correct decryption.
Finally observe that IOBC should only be used with relatively short mes-
sages. That is, as specied by Recacha [14] (and for reasons which become clear
below), a message to be encrypted using IOBC shall contain at most n2=2   1
plaintext blocks, where n is the plaintext block length. Thus for n = 64 and
n = 128, the two most commonly used block lengths, a message shall contain at
most 2047 and 8191 blocks, respectively.
2.5 Using IOBC for Integrity Protection
As already implied, IOBC is designed for combined condentiality and integrity
protection. Condentiality comes simply by encrypting the data using IOBC
mode. Integrity is achieved by adding an MDC to the end of the plaintext |
what Recacha [14] refers to as an Integrity Check Vector (ICV). After decryption
of an IOBC-protected message, the receiver must check that the ICV is correct,
and must reject the message if it is not.
Recacha recommends use of a secret ICV of length n=2. This ICV must
clearly be known to the intended recipient, and should therefore be regarded as
forming part of the key (along with the key K used in IOBC computations and
the key K 0 used to derive the IVs).
3 Preliminary Observations
We rst establish some simple results on the operation of the IOBC scheme.
The rst Lemma derives directly from a discussion in section 6 of [16]. It is also
implicit in the discussions of Recacha [14].
Lemma 1. Suppose [S]; C1; C2; : : : ; Ct and [S
0]; C 01; C
0
2; : : : ; C
0
t0 are IOBC en-
crypted versions of the plaintext sequences P1; P2; : : : ; Pt and P
0
1; P
0
2; : : : ; P
0
t0 , re-
spectively. If the ciphertext:
[S0]; C1 ; C

2 ; : : : ; C

t v+u =
[S0]; C 01; C
0
2; : : : ; C
0
u 1; Cv  g(G0u 1) g(Gv 1); Cv+1; : : : ; Ct
is submitted for IOBC decryption (where 1 < u and 1 < v < t, and Gv 1 and
G0u 1 are values computed during the encryption of the respective sequences of
blocks), then the resulting sequence of plaintext blocks P 1 ; P

2 ; : : : ; P

t v+u will be
equal to
P 01; P
0
2; : : : ; P
0
u 1; Pv  F 0u 1  Fv 1; Pv+1; Pv+2; : : : ; Pt:
Proof We rst note that it follows immediately from the denitions that
F i = F
0
i and G

i = G
0
i (1  i  u  1), where F 0i and G0i are the internal values
generated during the encryption process that yielded the ciphertext message
C 01; C
0
2; : : : ; C
0
t0 . Hence P

i = P
0
i (1  i  u  1).
We now consider the decryption of Cu. We have:
F u = C

u  g(Gu 1) (from section 2.3)
= Cv  g(G0u 1) g(Gv 1) g(Gu 1) (by defn. of Cu)
= Cv  g(Gv 1) (since Gu 1 = G0u 1)
= Fv (from section 2.3):
Hence Gu = Gv. Finally we have:
P u = G

u  F u 1 (from section 2.3)
= Gv  F 0u 1 (from above)
= Pv  F 0u 1  Fv 1 (from section 2.3):
We now consider the decryption of Cu+1. We have
F u+1 = C

u+1  g(Gu) (from section 2.3)
= Cv+1  g(Gv) (by defn. of Cu+1 and from above)
= Fv+1 (from section 2.3):
Hence Gu+1 = Gv+1. Finally, we have
P u+1 = G

u+1  F u (from section 2.3)
= Gv+1  Fv (from above)
= Pv+1 (from section 2.3):
The same argument shows that P u+i = Pv+i for every i  1, and the desired
result follows. 2
Remark 1. Lemma 1 suggests a way in which it may be possible to forge an
IOBC-encrypted message so that the nal block will contain the correct ICV.
However, the problem remains of discovering g(G0u 1)  g(Gv 1) (as used in
constructing the message in the statement of the lemma). Recacha [14] discusses
this very point, and explains that making this dicult motivates the inclusion of
the function g in the design of IOBC | that is, if g was not included (as is the
case for PES-PCBC), then simple forgeries could be achieved by manipulating a
single encrypted message for which part of the plaintext was known. We revisit
this point later, and show that g is not as eective in achieving the goal as
intended.
We next give some elementary observations on the operation of IOBC.
Lemma 2. Suppose [S]; C1; C2; : : : ; Ct is the encryption of P1; P2; : : : ; Pt using
IOBC, and that Fi and Gi are as dened in section 2.3. Then:
(i) Cj+1  Pj+2 = g(Gj) +Gj+2, 1  j  t  2;
(ii)
Lk
i=1 g
k i(Cj+2i 1  Pj+2i) = gk(Gj)  Gj+2k, 1  j  t   2, 1  k 
(t  j)=2.
Proof (i) follows immediately from the denition of the operation of IOBC.
(ii) follows by inductively applying (i), observing that g is a bit permutation,
and hence a linear function, and so it distributes across the bitwise exclusive-or
operation (). 2
Remark 2. It is not hard to see that if gk(Gj) = Gj for some k, then Lemma 2(ii)
could be combined with Lemma 1 to yield a forgery attack (given a ciphertext
message with corresponding known plaintext). This point is made by Recacha
[14], who explains that the bit permutation g has been chosen so that the smallest
integer i > 1 such that gi is the identity permutation is n2=4 1. The restriction
on the maximum length of messages that can be encrypted using IOBC, as
dened in section 2.4, prevents this problem arising in practice. However, as we
show next, in some cases gk is `close' to the identity permutation for signicantly
smaller values of k.
We conclude this section by giving certain properties of the function g. We
examine two special cases of particular practical importance, i.e. where n is
either 64 or 128. We rst consider the case n = 64.
Lemma 3. If X is a randomly selected 64-bit block then:
Pr(X = g341(X)) = 2 22:
Proof As in section 2.3, put X = LX jjRX , where LX and RX are 31-bit and
33-bit blocks, respectively. Let Y = g341(X), and, analogously, let Y = LY jjRY .
We rst observe that LX = LY . This follows immediately from the denition
of g and the observation that 341 = 31 11, i.e. it is a multiple of 31.
Secondly, we show that Pr(RX = RY ) = 2
 22. To establish this, rst observe
that 341 = 10 33 + 11, i.e. RY =>11 (RX). Since 33 = 3 11, it follows that
RY = RX if and only if RX = ZjjZjjZ, where Z is an arbitrary 11-bit string.
There are clearly 211 such strings Z, and hence the probability that RY = RX
is 211=233, and the claim follows. This establishes the desired result. 2
An analogous result holds for n = 128, as follows.
Lemma 4. If X is a randomly selected 128-bit block then:
Pr(X = g1365(X)) = 2 42:
Proof As previously, let X = LX jjRX , where LX and RX are 63-bit and 65-
bit blocks, respectively. Put Y = g1365(X), and dene LY and RY analogously
to the proof of the previous lemma.
Since 1365 = 2165 it follows that RY = RX . Also, since 1365 = 2163+42,
and since 21j42 and 21j63, we have LY = LX if and only if LX = ZjjZjjZ, where
Z is an arbitrary 21-bit string. The result now follows. 2
Remark 3. Similar results can be achieved for any n = 2m since, for every m,
either 2m   1 or 2m + 1 is a multiple of 3.
4 A Known-Plaintext Forgery Attack on IOBC
The main elements of the attack are now in place. We suppose that the attacker
has access to a number of ciphertext messages all encrypted using the same key,
and that the attacker also knows large parts of the plaintext for these messages.
The precise number of messages required for the attack will depend on the
message lengths and the value of n. We look at two special cases of particular
importance.
4.1 The Case n = 64
We start by considering the case n = 64, as applies for standardized block ciphers
such as 3DES, MISTY1 and CAST-128 [17]. In this case the denition of IOBC
requires that messages encrypted using IOBC contain at most 2047 blocks.
Suppose the attacker has obtained a ciphertext message [S]; C1; C2; : : : ; Ct
where t  685. Suppose also that the attacker knows the corresponding plaintext
blocks P1; P2; : : : ; Pt (in fact, the attack we describe does not require the attacker
to know all the plaintext blocks, as will become clear). Using Lemma 2(ii) with
j = 1 and k = 341, the attacker can use knowledge of C2; C4; : : : ; C682 and
P3; P5; : : : ; P683 to compute g
341(G1)G683.
The attacker now constructs a new ciphertext message [S]; C1 ; C

2 ; : : : ; C

t 682
equal to the following sequence of blocks:
[S]; C1; C684  g342(G1) g(G683); C685; : : : ; Ct:
Note that g342(G1)g(G683) can be obtained simply by applying g to g341(G1)
G683.
By Lemma 3, the probability that g342(G1)  g(G683) = g(G1)  g(G683) is
2 22, assuming that the encryption algorithm generates randomly distributed
ciphertext blocks. If this event occurs, then, by Lemma 1, the result of IOBC
decrypting [S]; C1 ; C

2 ; : : : ; C

t 682 will be equal to:
P1; P684  F1  F683; P685; P686; : : : ; Pt:
That is, since t  685, the nal plaintext block will contain the correct ICV, i.e.
[S]; C1 ; C

2 ; : : : ; C

t 682 will be a successful forgery.
The above attack, which essentially involves cutting out 682 consecutive ci-
phertext blocks from a valid message and modifying the ciphertext block imme-
diately after the removed portion, will yield a successful forgery with probability
2 22. In the example above, the removed ciphertext blocks were C2; C3; : : : ; C683,
but essentially the same attack will work by removing any sequence of 682 con-
secutive ciphertext blocks as long as it does not include the rst block or the nal
two blocks. Thus, for example, a message containing 1808 blocks (well short of
the maximum of 2047) could be used to construct 1024 = 210 dierent possible
forgeries, each of which would have a probability of 2 22 of being accepted as
legitimate. A simple argument shows that 1000{2000 encrypted messages of this
length could therefore yield 221{222 forgeries, at least one of which is likely to
be accepted.
We therefore conclude that the IOBC integrity protection mechanism can,
in this case, be defeated with potentially as few as 1000{2000 known plaintexts
and 221{222 queries to a decrypting party.
4.2 The Case n = 128
We next consider the case n = 128, as applies for standardized block ciphers such
as AES, Camellia and SEED [17]. In this case the denition of IOBC requires
that messages encrypted using IOBC contain at most 8191 blocks.
An exactly analogous approach will clearly work here as for the n = 64 case,
except that in this case we need to omit 2730 consecutive ciphertext blocks from
a valid message, and make appropriate modications to the ciphertext block
immediately following the omitted sequence. In this case, the probability of the
forged message being accepted will be 2 42 (from Lemma 4). As in the 64-bit
case, a single message could yield a number of possible forgeries. For example, a
6829-block message could be used to generate 212 dierent possible forgeries. A
total of 241{242 forgery attempts will be required to have a good chance of having
at least one forgery accepted, potentially requiring 229{230 known plaintexts (if
they have an average length of around 7000 blocks).
This is a rather large number, but signicantly less than the 264 which is the
design goal.
4.3 Other Values of n
The same general approach will work for any value of n (see Remark 3), yield-
ing a known-plaintext-based forgery attack with complexity approximately 2n=3
decryptions and somewhat less than 2n=3 known plaintexts.
5 Can IOBC be Fixed?
It is not hard to see that the attacks in section 4 could be prevented by further
limiting the maximum length of message that can be encrypted using IOBC
mode. However, unless the limit is made very small, less eective versions of the
attack described in section 4 will still apply, where the exact results will depend
on the factorisation of 2m   1 and 2m + 1.
For example, for the n = 64 case (i.e. m = 6) we know that, for randomly
chosen blocks (X, Y ) of 33 and 31 bits respectively, Pr(g93(X) = X) = 2 30 and
g93(Y ) = Y . That is a forgery attack with a success probability of 2 30 could be
launched using a ciphertext (with known plaintext) of length only 100 blocks.
Of course, it may be possible to devise signicantly more secure schemes by
choosing g to be more complex, but this would reduce the attractiveness of the
scheme. After all, the only reason to adopt this approach instead of `encrypt
then MAC' (which is provably secure) is to reduce the complexity of protecting
the message to that of encryption plus a small delta.
6 A Chosen-Plaintext Forgery Attack
All the attacks we have considered so far can be avoided if only relatively short
messages are encrypted. Moreover, these attacks take advantage of special prop-
erties of the function g. As a result, it is of at least theoretical interest to know
the level of security provided by IOBC mode regardless of the length of plaintext
messages and of the choice of g.
We thus conclude the main part of the paper by sketching a certicational
chosen-plaintext-based forgery attack which serves to limit the security of IOBC
regardless of length limits for plaintexts (and the choice of g). Suppose that
[S]; C1; C2; : : : ; Ct and [S
0]; C 01; C
0
2; : : : ; C
0
t0 are IOBC encrypted versions of the
plaintext sequences P1; P2; : : : ; Pt and P
0
1; P
0
2; : : : ; P
0
t0 , respectively. Suppose also
that P 0i = Pj and P
0
i+1 = Pj+1.
It is not hard to see that if C 0i = Cj and C
0
i+1 = Cj+1 then, with very
high probability, we have F 0i 1 = Fj 1, and hence G
0
i 1 = Gj 1 and G
0
i+1 =
Gj+1. If such an event occurs, then, by Lemma 1, the constructed ciphertext
message [S0]; C 01; C
0
2; : : : ; C
0
i 1; Cj ; Cj+1; : : : ; Ct will very conveniently decrypt to
P 01; P
0
2; : : : ; P
0
i 1; Pj ; Pj+1; : : : ; Pt, i.e. a MAC forgery has been constructed. By
the usual `birthday paradox' probabilistic arguments, to nd such an event sim-
ply requires around 2n=2 chosen plaintexts to be encrypted, each containing the
same consecutive pair of plaintext blocks. In fact, the number of required chosen
plaintext encryptions can be reduced to signicantly less than 2n=2 by including
many occurrences of the xed pair of plaintext blocks in each chosen plaintext.
That is, regardless of the lengths of plaintext messages and the choice of
g, forgery attacks on IOBC are possible if of the order of 2n=2 messages are
encrypted using the same key.
7 Summary and Conclusions
The analysis in this paper suggests that IOBC does not oer an adequate level
of security for routine use as the basis of a combined integrity and condentiality
technique. In fact, use of the `add redundancy and then encrypt using a special
mode' approach to provide combined integrity and condentiality protection is
no longer `state of the art', and so this is arguably not a major development. The
main signicance is that, as mentioned in section 1, IOBC was the only remaining
proposed block cipher mode for simultaneous condentiality and integrity pro-
tection known to the author which had not already been shown to suer from
forgery attack issues. Hence this paper serves to bring a cryptographic chapter
to a tidy close.
As discussed in many other places, if both condentiality and integrity pro-
tection are required, then either encryption and a MAC should be combined in
an appropriate way, or a dedicated `authenticated encryption' mode should be
used | see, for example, ISO/IEC 19772 [3]. Indeed, a wide variety of provably
secure schemes are available.
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